Natural Constraints
To those who have little experience with pictures of this kind, Mondrian's Composition with Red, Yellow and Blue from 1921 will remain infinitely ambiguous. To see why it is literally true of all pictures that they are infinitely ambiguous to those who are sufficiently inexperienced, we can devote a few minutes of our lives to the conditions of perspectival drawing. Diirer's woodcut from Unterweisung der Messung (1525) shows how a lute will be projected onto a screen or a sheet of paper from a given point of view in accordance with rules of projection delimited by nature (the laws of optics) (Fig. l) . The lute may be represented in infinitely many ways by varying the position of the lute. And it is also true of any given projection that it might be taken as a projection of infinitely many other things than this lute. As Gombrich puts it in Art and Illusion, 'any number of objects can be constructed that will result in the identical aspect from the peephole'.2 One can, e.g., think of any number of wire constructions which will result in the same projection on the ~c r e e n .~ Or think of all the things that can be represented, more or less adequately, by a couple of circles (Teacup and Saucer, Dime on Dollar, Mexican Siesta, Football in Moonlight, you continue).
The conditions which hold for the picture-object relation can be summed up in the following way:
(1) Any given picture can be a picture of an infinite number of objects.
(2) A given picture cannot be a picture of whatever objects you like; there are restrictions on the kinds of things that a given picture can be a picture of.
The first point is uncontroversial. Some reflection on the Mexican Siesta and Dime on Dollar examples should be enough to remove disagreement about this condition. The second is more controversial, it seems. Semioticians like Umberto Eco and philosophers like Nelson Goodman would seem to defend the thesis that all pictures are wholly conventional. If someone denies the existence of 'iconical signs', that is signs which depend upon a natural similarity between picture and object, like the representations of the male and female genitals you find in public toilets, if someone poses himselfherself in that position, I do not want to argue in any other way than by drawing attention to the geometrical necessities exploited in perspectival drawing. And I should also insist on making a distinction between natural and unnatural pictures. By a natural picture I mean a picture which can be seen to be a picture of a certain kind of object. By an unnatural picture I mean, for instance, a drawing which can only be taken to be a representation of a certain kind of object after a process of calculation, decipherment, decoding (in the everyday sense of that word, not in the strained semiotic sense which goes back to Ferdinand de Saussure, which makes all understanding a matter of coding, decoding and interpretation). Diirer's woodcuts could be systematically disformed in such a way that you would have to use a suitable computer programme in order to be able to correlate them rightly with situations in our world. Soren Kjorup's drawing from 1980 ( Fig. 2) is unobjectionable as a (somewhat clumsy) drawing of a snake. When he makes a heroic attempt to persuade us that the same picture is a possible picture of a cat in our world, he is not equally convincing.4 That drawing is neither a natural picture of a cat nor an unnatural one, it seems. In the absence of a
